The topic of this monograph refers to the remuneration of executives and its relationship with corporate performance. The thesis provides the review of the compensation and corporate governance theories with the focus on the principal-agent theory, which describes the conflict of interests between shareholders and executives. It delivers a broad review of corporate governance models, and its control mechanisms. Executive remuneration is a motivational mechanism that should solve the agency problem by aligning incentives of the managers and the shareholders. The monograph involves the review of the structures of remuneration across selected countries, including Poland. It shows different performance measures and their correlations with the executive remuneration in the international studies. The main objective of this monograph is to examine the relationship of executive remuneration of the companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE), particularly the chief executing officer (CEO) total compensation and corporate performance, measured by the changes in market valuation. The hypothesis of this paper is: The total CEO compensation has a positive relationship with firm performance measured by the stock valuation for non-financial companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange. This study is the first of such complexity in the area of executive remuneration in Poland. Prof. dr hab. Maria Aluchna An original study both on Polish and international scale. The author undertook a difficult task and performed it in a way that demonstrated his high competences. Dr hab. Czes

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Spis treści

Executive remuneration and corporate performance eBook -- spis treści

• Cover
• Title page
• Copyright
• Table of contents
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction
• 1. Corporate governance and compensation theory
  • 1.1. Introduction
  • 1.2. Definition of corporate governance
  • 1.3. Compensation theory
    • 1.3.1. Reinforcement and expectancy theories
    • 1.3.2. Equity theories
    • 1.3.3. Agency theory
    • 1.3.4. Transaction cost theory and incomplete contracts theory
    • 1.3.5. Resource dependency theory
    • 1.3.6. Compensation theory summarised
  • 1.4. Corporate governance models
    • 1.4.1. Simple financial model
    • 1.4.2. Stewardship model
    • 1.4.3. Stakeholder model
    • 1.4.4. Political model
    • 1.4.5. Corporate governance models summarised
  • 1.5. Control mechanisms
    • 1.5.1. Internal control mechanisms
    • 1.5.2. External control mechanisms
    • 1.5.3. Motivational mechanisms
  • 1.6. Conclusions
• 2. Corporate governance and executive remuneration: An international comparison
  • 2.1. Introduction
  • 2.2. Corporate governance models across selected countries
    • 2.2.1. Geographical taxonomy of corporate governance models
    • 2.2.2. Corporate governance in the United States
    • 2.2.3. Corporate governance in the United Kingdom
    • 2.2.4. Corporate governance in Germany
    • 2.2.5. Corporate governance in Poland
  • 2.3. Executive remuneration across selected countries
    • 2.3.1. Components of executive remuneration
    • 2.3.2. Executive remuneration in the United States
    • 2.3.3. Executive remuneration in the European Union
    • 2.3.4. Executive remuneration in Poland
  • 2.4. Conclusions
• 3. Corporate performance and executive remuneration
  • 3.1. Introduction
  • 3.2. Factors of corporate performance[239]
    • 3.2.1. Defining performance
    • 3.2.2. Internal performance factors
    • 3.2.3. External performance factors
  • 3.3. Determinants of executive remuneration
    • 3.3.1. The significance of determinants of executive remuneration
    • 3.3.2. Managerial labour market as a determinant of executive remuneration
    • 3.3.3. The role of the board of directors in executive remuneration
    • 3.3.4. Sales, profits, and total assets as determinants of executive remuneration
    • 3.3.5. Other determinants of executive remuneration
  • 3.4. The influence of executive compensation on performance
  • 3.5. Conclusions
• 4. The influence of CEO compensation on performance of companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange
  • 4.1. Introduction
  • 4.2. Hypothesis development
  • 4.3. Data Analysis
    • 4.3.1. Sources of Data
    • 4.3.2. Scope of data sample
    • 4.3.3. The breakdown of CEO remuneration
  • 4.4. Research method
    • 4.4.1. Tools used
    • 4.4.2. Variables
  • 4.5. Descriptive statistics
  • 4.6. Model
  • 4.7. Assessment of the quality of the model
  • 4.8. Results
  • 4.9. Discussion
• Conclusions
• Bibliography
• List of abbreviations
• Tools used
• Appendices
  • Appendix I: Regression results for t for 20112015
    • Model Summary
    • Coefficients
    • Correlations with unstandardised residual
  • Appendix II: Regression results for t+1 for 20112015
    • Model Summary
    • Coefficients
    • Correlations with unstandardised residual
  • Appendix III: Regression results for t+2 for 20112015
    • Model Summary
    • Coefficients
    • Correlations with unstandardised residual
  • Appendix IV: Regression results for sample with state-owned companies excluded, 20112015
    • Model Summary
    • Coefficients
    • Correlations with unstandardised residual
    • List of excluded companies
• Footnotes